Conflicts Induced by Different Responses to Land Expropriation Among the Farmers Involved During Urbanization in China

Expropriation of collectively-owned land has become an important realistic path for achieving urban development and new urbanization in China considering the shortage of state-owned land. During this process, farmers involved in land expropriation are often in conflict with one another because of the asymmetry of their interests. Such conflicts have a considerable effect on social harmony and stability. However, few studies have investigated such conflict of interests between farmers. Therefore, this research analyzed game behavior for the conflict of interests among farmers. A two-dimensional symmetric evolutionary game model and a multi-agent simulation experiment were used to explore the conflicts induced by the farmers’ different responses to land expropriation. This research finds that the changing strategy choices of farmers in the evolutionary game on collectively owned land expropriation are the main reasons for the occurrence of villager’ confrontations and “nail households”. Results provide targeted policy recommendations for local governments to promote cooperation among farmers, thereby enhancing social harmony. The findings also serve as references for other countries and regions in dealing with intra-conflict of interests in land expropriation.